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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Michie Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the District Court correctly granted defendants'

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The Appellate Court reviews

the District Court's decision for correctness. Sanderson v. First
Security Leasing, 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992).
2.

Whether the District Court correctly granted defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Appellate Court reviews the

District Court's decision for correctness. Sanderson, 844 P.2d at
306.
3.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it

entered the Scheduling Order which mandated that all discovery be
completed by December 31, 1992.

The Appellate Court reviews the

District Court's actions for abuse of discretion.

Berrett v.

Denver and Rio Grande W.R. . 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
4.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it

refused to grant plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to
Complete Discovery and Trial Preparation.

The Appellate Court

reviews the District Court's actions for abuse of discretion.
Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are determinative:

(1) 29

U.S.C.A. § 793(b) (West Supp. 1993); (2) 29U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West
65154
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Supp. 1993); (3) 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (A)
U.S.C.A.
§ 1144(a)

§ 1104(a)(1)(D)
(West 1985);

(West

Supp.

WestSupp. 1993); (4) 29
1993);

(5) 29

U.S.C.A.

(6) Utah Code Ann. § 34-45 - 6 (1) (a) (i)

(Michie Supp. 1993); (7) Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Michie
Supp. 1993); (8) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (Michie 1988); (9) Utah
Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(1) (Michie 1992); and (10) Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 4-501(2)(b) (Michie 1993).

In accordance with Utah R.

App. P. 24(a)(6), these provisions are set out verbatim in the
addendum to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff has appealed from inter alia,

(1) the District

Court's grant of defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and his rulings related thereto; (2) the District Court's grant of
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and his rulings related
thereto; (3) the District Court's setting of the discovery cutoff
date; and (4) the District Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for
Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Trial Preparation. See
Plaintiff's Brief.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
A.

Complaint.

On June 15, 1990, plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County.

R.2-19.

Plaintiff

asserted five causes of action, all of which are related to the
cessation of his employment with defendant E-Systems.
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R.2-19.

B.

Legal representation of plaintiff.

Plaintiff was represented by L. Zane Gill at least from the
time he filed his Complaint on June 15, 1990 until August 6, 1991,
when Gill withdrew as plaintiff's counsel of record.

R.2, 156.

Plaintiff was represented by David K. Isom and Associates from
sometime prior to September 18, 1991 until March 22, 1992, when
that firm withdrew as plaintiff's counsel of record.
C.

R.325, 390.

Discovery.

On July 11, 1990, plaintiff served on defendants his extensive
First

Set of

Interrogatories

and Requests

for Production of

Documents, which consisted of "87 separate detailed interrogatories
and 31 detailed requests for production of documents." Plaintiff's
Brief at 44; R.21.

On September 26, 1990, defendants fully

responded thereto.

R.68.

On September 10-13, 1990, defendants

deposed plaintiff.

R.100-111.

On December 6, 1991, plaintiff

served his Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production
of Documents on defendants.

R.306.

dants fully responded thereto.
D.

On January 24, 1992, defen-

R.3 66.

Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendants' Counsel.

On November 26, 1991, plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify
Defendants' Counsel. R.285, 288. On December 9, 1991, defendants
filed their opposing memorandum.

R.307.

On December 19, 1991,

plaintiff filed his reply memorandum. R.336. On February 4, 1992,
plaintiff filed a supplemental supporting memorandum.

R.368. On

February 28, 1992, a hearing was held on plaintiff's Motion, and
the District Court denied that Motion.
65154
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R.391, 384, 394.

E.

Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

On September 25, 1991, defendants filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

R.164-253.

On October 28, 1991, the parties

stipulated that plaintiff would be allowed until November 5, 1991
within which to respond thereto, and the District Court signed an
Order to that effect.

R.254, 258.

Defendants later agreed to

extend this deadline to November 8, 1991.

R.327.

On November 8,

1991, plaintiff filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time Within Which
to File a Rule 56(f) Motion.

R.258.

On November 12, 1991, the

District Court signed an Order granting plaintiff until November
12, 1991 within which to file a 56(f) motion.

R.283. On November

12, 1991, plaintiff filed a 56(f) motion. R.265, 268. On November
27, 1991, the District Court, based on the stipulation of the
parties,

signed

an

Order

which

provided

that

the

discovery

plaintiff claimed to need in order to respond to the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment be completed by January 31, 1992 and that
plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment be filed by January 31, 1992.

R.304-05.

On

February 10, 1992, the District Court, based on the stipulation of
the parties, signed an Order which extended the foregoing deadlines
and provided that the discovery needed to respond to the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment be completed by March 16, 1992 and that
plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition tc the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment be filed by March 16, 1992.

R.3 04-05.

Dspite

these many extensions of time to complete discovery and to file a
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Memorandum in Opposition to defendants' Motion, plaintiff never
filed an opposing memorandum.
Thereafter, on April 14, 1992, defendants filed a Notice to
Submit their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Decision.
R.399.

On June 9, 1992, the District Court approved oral argument

on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, instructed defendants'
counsel to notice the matter on the court's Friday law and motion
calendar, and sent copies of the Approval for Oral Argument to the
parties.

R.405. On June 12, 1992, defendants noticed the hearing

on June 19, 1992. R.406-408.

On the afternoon of June 18, 1992,

plaintiff sent, via facsimile, a letter to the clerk of the
District Court requesting that the hearing on the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment be rescheduled. R.409. On June 19, 1992,
the hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was held, at
which the District Court granted defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and dismissed plaintiff's first, third, fourth,
and

fifth

causes

of action with prejudice.

Plaintiff did not participate in the hearing.
F.

R.416, 420-22.
R.416.

Scheduling conference.

On June 19, 1992, the District Court, on its own motion,
ordered that a scheduling conference be held on August 3, 1992.
R.414.

On August 3, 1992, a scheduling conference was held.

R.423.

Plaintiff and counsel for defendants attended the hearing.

The District Court discussed relevant cutoff dates with the parties
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and set a discovery cutoff of December 1, 1992 and a dispositive
motion cutoff of January 4, 1993. R.423.1
G.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

On December 31, 1992, defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

R.425-525.

On January 14, 1993, plaintiff filed a

letter with the District Court, without sending a copy to counsel
for defendants, requesting it to allow him to respond to the Motion
via facsimile on January 19, 1993.

R.526.

On January 15, 1993,

defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision.

R.527.

On

January 19, 1993, plaintiff apparently sent the District Court a
letter, again without sending a copy to counsel for defendants,
requesting it to allow him to respond to the Motion via facsimile
on January 22, 1993.

R.581.

On January 23, 1993, plaintiff sent

the District Court, via facsimile, a Response to Defendants' Motion
and

Notice

to

Submit

for Decision.2

defendants' filed a reply memorandum.

On

February

R.530.

3, 1993,

On February 16,

1993, the District Court directed that a Minute Entry be made in
which it granted the Motion for Summary Judgment.

R.539-40.

the same day (February 16, 1993), plaintiff filed:
for Continuance and for Leave to Complete Discovery,

On

(1) a Motion
R.542; and

(2) a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Reply Memorandum in

1

The scheduling order, which was prepared by the trial
court's clerk, mistakenly states that the dispositive motion cutoff
was January 4, 1992; however both parties were present at the
scheduling conference at which the correct dates were discussed and
confirmed. R.423.
2

This Response was never filed and thus was not made part
of the record.
65154
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Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
1993, defendants

filed a Response

R.545.

On February 18,

to Plaintiff's Motion for

Continuance and for Leave to Complete Discovery.

R.593.

On that

same day (February 18, 1993) the District Court made a second a
Minute Entry reaffirming its earlier ruling granting the Motion for
Summary Judgment. R.590-91. On February 23, 1993, defendants sent
plaintiff:

(1) a proposed Order Granting Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment, R.610-612; and (2) a proposed Judgment in favor
of defendants dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice, and
awarding defendants costs. R.623-24. On March 1, 1993, plaintiff
filed Objections to Defendants' Draft Order Granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and Proposed Judgment.

R.597.

On

March 2, 1993, defendants filed their Response to Plaintiff's
Objections to Defendants' Proposed Order and Form of Judgment.
R.606.

On March 9, 1993, the District Court signed the Order

Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Judgement
in favor of defendants dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice
and awarding defendants costs.

R.610-11.

On March 16, 1993,

defendants filed a Motion to Tax Costs and a Verified Memorandum of
Costs.
H.

R.626, 628.
Plaintiff's Deposition.

In May 1993, it came to the attention of defendants' counsel
that the transcript of plaintiff's deposition had inadvertently not
been filed with the District Court. Consequently, on June 7, 1993,
defendant filed a Motion to File Plaintiff's Deposition and Modify
the Judgment.
65154
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Judgment, but ordered

that:

(1) the original

transcript of

plaintiff's deposition be filed as of July 9, 1993 and unsealed as
previously

provided

by

the

Court's

granting

of

defendants'

September 25, 1991 Motion to Publish the Plaintiff's Deposition;
and (2) pursuant to Utah R. App, P. 11(h) the record be clarified
to show that the original transcript of plaintiff's deposition was
inadvertently not filed but that, in connection with their Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, defendants provided the Court with
courtesy copies of the pages of plaintiff's deposition on which
they relied in support of that Motion, and it is the District
Court's practice to review such deposition pages provided to it as
courtesy copies in connection with its consideration of motions.
See Order and Statement of Proposed Changes to the Record, a copy
of which is included in the addendum to this Brief.3
III. STATEMENT OP FACTS.
Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant E-Systems. At all
times relevant to this action, plaintiff was employed at E-Systems
Montek Division in Salt Lake City; he held the title of Director of
Procurement.

Plaintiff had no written employment contract and was

employed for an indefinite period of time. The principal businesses of E-Systems' Montek Division, located in Salt Lake City, are
the design, development and manufacture of hydraulic, electrohydraulic, and electromechanical flight controls systems for commercial
and military aircraft and the design and development of various
3

While this Order is not technically part of the record at
this trial, defendants believe the Court of Appeals should be aware
of it.
65154
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electronic systems used for navigation and air traffic control.
R.479.

Defendant Williams is the Vice President and General

Manager of E-Systems' Montek Division. R.478. Defendant Buchanan
is the Director of Human Resources of E-Systems' Montek Division.
R.224.
During the time plaintiff was employed at E-Systems, the
Montek Division worked on various contracts with other business
entities, including General Electric, Northrop, and Hazeltine,
Corp.
On June 18, 1986, a meeting was held to discuss organizational
changes which were being considered, as part of a cost cutting
initiative, by

the Montek Division.

R.479.

Plaintiff and

defendant Williams, among others, participated in this meeting.
R.480.

During the course of the meeting, plaintiff became very

upset, hostile, and abusive because he disagreed with the decisions
which were being made by the rest of the group. R.480-81. A short
time after the meeting ended, plaintiff met with defendant Buchanan
and Jim Cocke, the Director of Finance at the Montek Division, and
gave them a memorandum entitled "Letter of Resignation," which
tendered plaintiff's resignation unless the Company yielded to
plaintiff's demands.

R.481-82, 585.

Defendant Buchanan, Mr.

Cocke, and Defendant Williams met to discuss the situation and
decided to accept plaintiff's resignation as tendered.

R.482.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court correctly granted defendant's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment. The Appellate Court cannot consider
65154
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plaintiff's arguments related to this Motion because they were
never raised before the District Court; therefore, plaintiff has
failed to show that the District Court erred in granting that
Motion.

Even if the Appellate Court were to consider plaintiff's

argument, it still must affirm the District Court's granting of
this Motion because the District Court correctly dismissed with
prejudice the four causes of action addressed in this Motion for
the following reasons:

(A) plaintiff's first cause of action is

barred by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act as a matter of law; (B)
plaintiff's third cause of action fails because a claim for breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not
recognized by Utah law in the employment context, and there is no
genuine issue as to whether E-Systems established an express
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (C) plaintiff's fourth
cause of action is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act as a matter of law; and (D) plaintiff's fifth cause of
action fails because there is no admissible evidence in the record
which would allow plaintiff to establish key elements of this
claim.

Further, this claim is preempted by the Utah Workers'

Compensation Act.
II.

The District Court also properly granted defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff's claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.

The undisputed facts

are that plaintiff's employment ended as a result of his submission
of his Letter of Resignation, which was accepted by E-Systems.
Further, even if plaintiff had been discharged from his employment,

he would have no claim that his termination violated a clear and
substantial public policy of this State.

Finally, in response to

defendants' Motion, plaintiff offered no admissible evidence in the
record showing the existence of any triable issue of material fact.

III. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
set the discovery cutoff date.

The Appellate Court must assume

that the District Court properly exercised its discretion when it
set the discovery cutoff date unless the record clearly shows to
the contrary.
IV.

Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied plaintiff's belated Motion for Extension of Time.

The

Appellate Court must assume that the District Court properly
exercised its discretion when it denied plaintiff's Motion for
Extension of Time unless the record clearly shows to the contrary.
Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing.

65154
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

The Appellate Court Cannot Consider Plaintiff's Arguments
Related To Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Because They Were Never Raised Before The
District Court.

The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
repeatedly held that they will not consider issues on appeal which
were not raised before the District Court,

See, e.g.. Turtle

Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah
1982) ("This Court will not consider on appeal issues which were
not submitted to the District Court . . . . " ) ; State v. Castner,
825 P.2d 699, 705 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("We will not consider
an argument

on appeal unless

it was

raised at the District

Court."); LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 482-84
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In the instant case, none of plaintiff's arguments opposing
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which plaintiff
now asserts for the first time in his Brief, were raised before the
District Court, and the District Court did not have an opportunity
to rule on them. Therefore, these arguments cannot be considered.
Turtle Management, 645 P.2d at 671; Castner, 825 P.2d at 705 n.4;
LeBaron, 823 P. 2d at 482-84.

There is no justification for

departure from this rule in the instant case.

Plaintiff had more

than ample opportunity to respond to the Motion for Partial Summary
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Judgment and to make arguments opposing the Motion before the
District Court; he simply failed to do so.4
Therefore, plaintiff has failed to show that the District
Court erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
and the District Court's decision must be affirmed.
B.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed With Prejudice The
Four Causes Of Action Addressed In Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

Even if the Court of Appeals could consider plaintiff's
arguments now attacking the granting of defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, it still must affirm the District Court's

4

Prior to the trial court's ruling on the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, plaintiff, while represented by counsel,
conducted extensive discovery. See discussion on discovery above.
For nearly six months after defendants filed their Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, plaintiff, who was represented by counsel
at the time, was repeatedly granted extensions to complete
discovery related to that Motion and to respond to that Motion.
R.254, 258, 327, 304-05. Plaintiff conducted discovery, R.306;
however, he never responded to the Motion. On April 14, 1992, one
month after the expiration of plaintiff's final extension,
defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and sent a copy of
the Notice to plaintiff. R.399, 402. On June 9, 1992, the trial
court approved oral argument on defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, instructed defendants' counsel to notice the
matter on the court's Friday law and motion calendar, and sent
copies of the Approval for Oral Argument to the parties. R.405.
On June 12, 1992, defendants noticed the hearing for June 19, 1992
and sent notice of the hearing date to plaintiff. R.406-408. On
the afternoon before the hearing was scheduled to take place,
plaintiff, despite having had nearly two months notice that a
hearing on the Motion would be held, sent, via facsimile, a letter
to the clerk of the trial court requesting that the hearing on
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be rescheduled.
R.409. The trial court went ahead with the hearing on June 19,
1992 (nearly nine months after defendants filed their Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment) at which it granted defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed plaintiff's first,
third, fourth, and fifth causes of action with prejudice. R.416,
420-22. Plaintiff did not participate in the hearing in person or
via telephone. R.416
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ruling because, as the following discussion shows, the District
Court's ruling was proper.
1.

Plaintiff's first cause of action (breach of public
policy against employment discrimination of the
disabled).

In his Complaint's first cause of action, plaintiff alleges
defendants violated public policy by terminating him because of his
disability.
The

R.ll.

District

Id.5
Court

correctly

dismissed

this

claim

with

prejudice because it is barred by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
("UADA").6
5

Plaintiff also claims that Utah public policy requires
all employers receiving federal financial assistance to comply with
the requirements of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. R.10.
Plaintiff offers no support for the proposition that the federal
Rehabilitation Act is somehow incorporated into Utah State public
policy. In any event, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is inapplicable to the instant case because defendant E-Systems does not
receive and has not received, at any time relevant to this action,
"federal financial assistance," which is required under § 504.
R.222; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Therefore, plaintiff's claim related to
§ 504 fails.
In his Brief, plaintiff for the first time invokes § 503 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Section 503 cannot support
plaintiff's claim. First, there is no private right of action
under § 503. Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 728
F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1984) cert, denied. 469 U.S. 822 (1984).
Second, § 503 preempts "a qualified handicapped individual's claim
under state law as a third party beneficiary of the affirmative
action clause contained in contracts between his employer and the
federal government." Howard v. Uniroyal. Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1555
(11th Cir. 1983) . Third, plaintiff offers no support for the
proposition that the federal Rehabilitation Act is somehow
incorporated into Utah State public policy. Finally, plaintiff
points to no admissible evidence in the record which supports the
key factual allegations related to this claim.
6

As noted above at § I.A., none of plaintiff's arguments
related to his fourth cause of action should be considered because
plaintiff did not raise those arguments oelow.
65154
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The UADA provides the exclusive remedy under state law for
employment discrimination based on handicap; therefore, the UADA
bars all common law claims for employment discrimination based upon
handicap, including plaintiff's first cause of action.
Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1(15)

Utah Code

(Michie Supp. 1993); Retherford v. AT&T

Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 963 (Utah 1992).
In the instant case, under the indispensable element test,
which the Utah Supreme Court adopted in Retherford, plaintiff's
first cause of action is preempted by the UADA because the UADA
addresses employment discrimination based on handicap, which is a
necessary element of plaintiff's claim.
965.;

Retherford, 844 P.2d at

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i)

(Michie Supp. 1993).

Indeed, plaintiff's proposed public policy claim is indistinguishable from the claim found to be barred in Retherford. In that
case, the plaintiff relied upon the UADA's express prohibition of
"retaliation" against persons complaining of discrimination as the
basis for her "public policy" claim.

Retherford, 844 P.2d at 965.

Here, plaintiff relies upon the prohibition against "handicap"

In support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
defendants established through admissible evidence the underlying
material facts which supported their Motion. See R.5-7. Plaintiff
failed to specifically controvert these material facts in an
opposing memorandum; therefore, these facts are deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment.
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R.4501(2) (b). Even if these material facts were not deemed to be
admitted, plaintiff has failed to point out any admissible evidence
in the record which could now be used to controvert the material
facts upon which defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
was based.
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discrimination.

Plaintiff's claim is thus foreclosed for the very

reasons articulated in Retherford.7
2.

Plaintiff's third cause of action (breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

In his third cause of action, plaintiff alleges he was forced
to resign arbitrarily and without good cause in violation of a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R.14.
The District

Court

correctly

prejudice for the following reasons.8

dismissed

this

claim

with

First, a claim for breach

of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not recognized by Utah law in the employment context. Brehany v. Nordstrom,
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55-56 (Utah 1991); Berube v. Fashion Centre,
Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
Second, there is no genuine issue as to whether E-Systems
established anything that plaintiff now would call an "express"
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.9

In support of his

7

Courts in other jurisdictions have also uniformly refused
to recognize a public policy common law claim where a statutorilycreated administrative process provides a remedy for the underlying
injury, even in the absence of an express exclusive remedy
provision. See e.g. . Poison v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705, 709 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that Kansas would not recognize a public policy
wrongful discharge claim based on a statutorily-created public
policy prohibiting employment discrimination where administrative
remedy available); Jones v. Indus. Elec.-Seattle. 768 P.2d 520, 522
(Wash. App, 1989) (no public policy wrongful discharge claim for
retaliatory discrimination where statute provides administrative
remedy).
See note 6 above.
9

Again, plaintiff should not be permitted to declare and
respond to defendant's Motion in the lower court, and now recharacterize his claim on appeal.
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argument that there is such an issue, plaintiff relies entirely on
defendants' responses to plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories.
See Plaintiff's Brief at 28-30,
responses is misplaced because:

Plaintiff's reliance on those
(1) those responses are not even

properly before this Court; (2) plaintiff mischaracterizes some of
those responses;10 and (3) those responses could not be the basis
for any conclusion that E-Systems established an "express" covenant
of good

faith and

fair dealing with plaintiff.

Therefore,

plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to this fact. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
Therefore, the District Court correctly dismissed plaintiff's
second cause of action with prejudice.
3.

Plaintiff's
contract).

fourth

cause

of

action

(breach of

In his breach of contract claim, plaintiff alleges defendant
Buchanan

failed

to

provide

plaintiff

with

conversion

forms

necessary to convert his health and life insurance to individual
insurance policies. R.7-9.
The

District

Court

correctly

dismissed

this

claim with

prejudice because it is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA").
ERISA preempts all state laws, including private causes of
action, which "relate to" any "ERISA-governed employee benefit
plan."

29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines,

10

See, e.g.. plaintiff's characterizations of defendants'
responses to interrogatories 32, 54, and 58 on pages 29 and 30 of
plaintiff's Brief.
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Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. 481
U.S. 41, 45, 54 (1987).

"'A law 'relates to' an employee benefit

plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection
with or reference
McClendon, 498 U.S.

to such a plan.'"

Ingersoll-Rand

Co. v.

, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 474, 484 (1990)

(quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97).

In short, any state statute,

state common law claim, or regulation which refers to or has a
connection with an ERISA-governed plan is preempted by ERISA.
In McClendon, the Supreme Court held that a state common law
claim, which asserted that an employee was unlawfully terminated to
prevent the attainment of rights under an employee benefit plan,
was explicitly preempted by ERISA because it made reference to and
was premised

on the existence

of an ERISA-governed

benefits plan, and thus it "related to" that plan.

employee

Id. at 484-86.

The Court held that the state common law claim was also impliedly
preempted by ERISA because it conflicted directly with ERISA due to
the fact that is was essentially a claim under ERISA Section 510,
which prohibits interference with an employee's rights or attainment of rights under a plan.

Id. at 486-87.

In the instant case, plaintiff's breach of contract claim is
expressly preempted by ERISA. Plaintiff's breach of contract claim
is premised entirely upon the alleged failure of defendant Buchanan
to provide plaintiff with conversion forms necessary to convert his
health and life insurance to individual insurance policies.11 R.711

Even though plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he
was entitled to a one-on-one "exit interview" with Buchanan, he has
failed to identify anything he would have gained out of such an
65154
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9. The duty to provide plaintiff with the conversion forms arises
out of and is wholly dependent on the E-Systems Health Care and
Weekly Income Disability Plan and the E-Systems Pru-opt Plan,12
both of which are "welfare benefit plans" under ERISA.13
U.S.C.A

§ 1002(1) (A) (West Supp. 1993)

"welfare benefit plans").
quoted above.

See 29

(expressively defining

Definition of "Welfare Benefit Plan"

Therefore, plaintiff's breach of contract claim,

like the common law claim in McClendon, "relates to" ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans and is explicitly preempted by ERISA.14 See
interview other than an insurance conversion form.
12

The procedure for converting to an individual hospital
and surgical expense policy is set forth in E-Systems' Health Care
and Weekly Income Disability Plan as follows: "Application for the
individual policy must be made and the first premium paid within 31
days from the termination of the Plan coverage . . . . A form to
be used for this purpose will be furnished by the benefits office."
R.236 (Exhibit A to Buchanan Affidavit at 14) . Similarly, the
procedure for converting to an individual life insurance policy
upon termination is set forth in E-Systems' PRU-OPT Plan as
follows:
"You must obtain a conversion form from the Benefits
office and take it, along with your certificate of Pru-Opt
coverage, to the nearest Prudential office for processing within 31
days of your termination date." R.242, 248 (Exhibit B to Buchanan
Affidavit at 3, 15).
13

In his brief, plaintiff attempts to avoid preemption by
arguing that his breach of contract claim arises solely from
defendants' failure to fulfill contract obligations which arose out
of company policy and oral covenants. Id. This argument fails for
the following two reasons. First, as the discussion in the main
text of this brief illustrates, the duty defendant Buchanan
allegedly breached arose out of ERISA-governed employee benefit
plans; therefore, plaintiff's claim "relates to" those plans and is
preempted by ERISA. Second, plaintiff has failed to point to any
admissible evidence in the record which could support a finding
that there were such contract obligations which arose out of
company policy or any oral covenants.
14

Plaintiff's claim related to the PRU-OPT plan also fails
on the merits because the plan provides that it is the responsibility of the plan participant to "obtain a conversion form from
65154
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also Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at 57 (state common law tortious
breach of contract suit asserting improper processing of claim for
benefits

under

an

ERISA-regulated

plan

preempted

by

ERISA);

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987) (state
common law contract and tort suit asserting improper denial of
benefits, mental anguish, wrongful termination, and retaliation in
connection with an ERISA-regulated insurance plan preempted by
ERISA) . 15
In sum, plaintiff's breach of contract claim is preempted by
ERISA as a matter of law; therefore, the District Court was correct
in dismissing that claim with prejudice.
4.

Plaintiff's fifth cause of action (infliction of
emotional distress)•

In his fifth cause of action, plaintiff alleges defendants'
conduct caused him to incur mental and emotional suffering. R.16.

the Benefits office and take it, along with your certificate of
PRU-OPT coverage, to the nearest Prudential office for processing
within 31 days of your termination date." R.248 (emphasis added).

15

Plaintiff's claim is also impliedly preempted by ERISA
because, like the plaintiff in McClendon, plaintiff here is
attempting to assert what is at bottom an ERISA claim through a
state common law cause of action. Plaintiff asserts that defendant
Buchanan and others, who are responsible for supplying "conversion"
forms in accordance with the terms of the ERISA-governed employee
benefit plans at issue, failed to provide him such forms. R.7-9.
Section 404 of ERISA requires plan fiduciaries (persons who
administer the terms of employee benefit plans) to administer
employee benefit plans in accordance with the terms of the plans
themselves. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) 'West Supp. 1993). Consequently, plaintiff's breach of contract claim falls squarely within
the ambit of ERISA Section 404; therefore, it conflicts with ERISA
and also is impliedly preempted by ERISA.
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The District
prejudice because:

Court

correctly

dismissed

this

claim with

(a) there is no admissible evidence in the

record which would allow plaintiff to establish key elements of
this claim; and

(b) this claim also is preempted by the Utah

Workers' Compensation Act as a matter of law.16
a.

Lack of admissible evidence in the record as
to key elements of this claim.
i.

Outrageous conduct.

A plaintiff claiming infliction of emotional distress must
prove, inter alia, that the defendant engaged in conduct which was
so "outrageous and intolerable [as to] offend against generally
accepted standards of decency and morality."
P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961).

Samms v. Eccles, 358

The Samms "outrageous and intolerable

standard should be interpreted in light of Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46, comment d (1965), which states:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been
so outrageous in character, so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.
. . . . It has not been enough that the defendant has
acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal,
or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or
even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice, "
or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the
plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.
Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop. 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1029 (D. Utah
1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Thus,
the requirement that the defendant's conduct be outrageous and
intolerable is a substantial one.

See note 6 above.
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This is further illustrated by

the types of conduct in the workplace which courts applying Utah
law have held does not rise to the necessary level of outrageous ness .17
Whether the conduct in which a defendant has engaged rises to
the necessary level of "outrageousness" is a question of law for
the court to decide.

See Sperber v. Galligher Ash Co,, 747 P.2d

1025, 1028 (Utah 1987) (affirming summary judgment on ground that
conduct was not outrageous enough to support action for infliction
of emotional distress); Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co.. 712 F. Supp. 1514, 1521-22 (D. Utah 1989).
In the instant case, plaintiff simply makes wholly conclusory
and unsupported allegations related to the conduct in which he
claims defendants

engaged.

See

Plaintiff's Brief

at 36-41.

Plaintiff has failed to point to any admissible evidence in the
record which would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that
defendants engaged in outrageous conduct, and thus, has failed to
raise any genuine issues as to this factual element of his claim.

17

See e.g.. Jenks v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 53
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1708, 1720-22 (D. Utah 1989) (supervisor's racial slurs, jokes, and other rude and non-sympathetic
behavior toward the plaintiff was not outrageous); Maxfield v.
North Am, Philips Consumer Elec. Corp.. 5 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas.
(BNA) 442, 446 (D. Utah 1989) (supervisor's statement that the
plaintiff must sell 120% of his quota and that he would see to that
the plaintiff could not do so was not outrageous) ; Sperber. 747
P.2d at 1028 (wrongful discharge and lying to employee about
reasons for discharge was not outrageous) ; Amos v. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop. 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1029 (D. Utah 1985)
(discriminatory discharge which caused embarrassment, distress, and
humiliation was not outrageous), rev'd in part on other grounds.
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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Therefore, the District Court correctly dismissed plaintiff's
infliction of emotional distress claim with prejudice.
ii.

Severe emotional distress as a result of
de f endan t s' conduc t.

A plaintiff claiming infliction of emotional distress must
also prove, that he or she actually suffered "severe" emotional
distress as a result of the defendant's conduct.

Samms, 358 P.2d

at 347.
Whether a plaintiff suffered "severe" emotional distress as a
result of the defendant's conduct is also a question of law for the
court to decide.

See, Jenks, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at

1721-22 (dismissed emotional distress claim because, inter alia,
the plaintiff had not established that the distress she suffered as
a result of the defendant's actions was severe emotional distress);
Poison v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130, 1151 (D. Kan. 1986) (dismissed
emotional distress claim because plaintiff failed to establish
"that the emotional distress she suffered was so severe that no
reasonable person should be expected to endure it"), aff'd on other
grounds. 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990).
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to point to any
admissible evidence in the record which could support a reasonable
finding that he suffered "severe" emotional distress as a result of
defendants' conduct.18

Therefore, the District Court correctly

18

In his brief, plaintiff argues that defendants, in their
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
"admit that [plaintiff] sought medical treatment for his severe
emotional distress in May of 1989." Plaintiff's Brief at 41. This
is false. Defendants stated that plaintiff testified that he did
not seek medical treatment for his alleged emotional distress until
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dismissed plaintiff infliction of emotional distress claim with
prejudice.
b.

Plaintiff's infliction of emotional distress
claim is barred by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act as a matter of law*

The Utah Workers' Compensation Act bars claims by employees
against their employers or co-workers for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress unless the employer or co-worker
actually intended that the employee be injured.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 35-1-60 (Michie 1988); Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823
P.2d 1055
ployee's

(Utah 1991)
claims

of

(damages arising from the plaintiff-em-

intentional

and

negligent

infliction

of

emotional distress could only be compensated under the workers'
compensation scheme unless the plaintiff-employee could prove that
the defendant-employer directed or intended the act which allegedly
caused

the plaintiff-employee

emotional

distress);19

Lantz v.

after his neck surgery in May of 1989, nearly three years after he
left E-Systems.
R.215.
This is not an admission plaintiff
actually did seek medical treatment for his "severe emotional
distress" in May of 1989. Furthermore, even if plaintiff could
point to admissible evidence in the record to prove that he sought
medical treatment for emotional distress in May of 1989, that is
far short of the required showing that his emotional distress is
severe and a result of defendants' conduct. See Eklund v. Vincent
Brass & Aluminum Co.. 351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(employee who consulted physician because of nervous condition and
psychologist because of stress did not establish severe emotional
distress).
19

In his Brief, plaintiff argues that in Mounteer v. Utah
Power & Light Co. , 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) and Bryan v. Utah
Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court "made it
absolutely clear that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act does NOT
bar a claim by an employee against an employer for intentional
infliction emotional distress." Plaintiff's Brief at 38. This
argument misses the point. As the discussion in the main text of
this brief illustrates, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act does bar
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National Semi-Conductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) . See also Star v. Industrial Comm'n. 615 P.2d 436, 437 (Utah
1980); Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1047, 1049-50 (D. Utah 1990).
In the instant case, plaintiff has pointed to no admissible
evidence in the record that the defendants deliberately intended to
injure plaintiff; therefore, plaintiff's infliction of emotional
distress claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and the District Court correctly
dismissed that claim with prejudice.

a claim by an employee against an employer - for intentional
infliction of emotional distress unless the employer actually
intended that the employee be injured. Mounteer directly supports
this interpretation. See discussion the main text of this brief.
Bryan also supports this interpretation. In Bryan. the plaintiff
employee sued his employer and a co-worker for injuries he received
when the co-worker intentionally and with malice aforethought
started his pickup intending to jerk a cable against the plaintiff's body. Bryan, 533 P.2d at 892. The court held that the
Workers' Compensation Act did not bar the plaintiff's suit against
the co-worker for damages which resulted from the co-worker's
intentional act by which he intended to injure the plaintiff. Id.
at 894. The court held that the plaintiff's claim against his
employer was barred by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act because
there was no evidence that the injurious act was directed or
intended by the employer. Id. at 894-95.
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In sum, the District Court correctly dismissed plaintiff's
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action with prejudice;
thus it correctly granted Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and its ruling should be affirmed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S SECOND ASSERTED CAUSE OF
ACTION.
In Count

II of his Complaint,

Plaintiff

claims

he was

terminated from his employment in violation of an asserted public
policy "against fraudulent business activities." R.ll. Plaintiff
alleged that he was terminated because of his actions in connection
with three separate E-Systems contracts, the General Electric
contract,

the

contract.

R. 12-13 .20

A.

Northrop

actuator

contract

and

the

Hazeltine

Plaintiff's Public Policy Allegations Fail to State a
Claim Under Utah Law.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a claim for wrongful
termination in violation of a fundamental public policy. The Court
has repeatedly emphasized, however, that this is a narrow exception
to the at-will employment rule.

Such claims must be based upon

"substantial and important public policies." Berube Fashion Centre

20

As the following argument shows, the District Court
properly granted defendants' Motion in part because, as the Court
noted in its second Minute Entry, "[Plaintiff's] statements are
purely conclusory and Mr. Penney has offered no admissible evidence
to support these conclusions." R. 591. Defendants will rely upon
plaintiff's deposition in the following argument only for the
purpose of explaining why his submissions are indeed conclusory and
lacking in foundation:
Because plaintiff lacks any personal
knowledge to support his claim.
Even without considering
plaintiff's deposition testimony, however, it is clear that the
District Court properly dismissed his public policy claim.
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Ltd. 771 P. 2d 1033, 1042

(emphasis in original).

Peterson V. Browning 832 P.2d 1280, 1283, 1285-86
(same).

See also
(Utah 1992)

In cases of employee termination, public policy is to be

derived from:

(1) legislative enactments which "protect the public

or promote public interests;" and

(2) judicial pronouncements.

Berube, supra, 771 P.2d at 1043.
It is a plaintiff's burden to demonstrate, first, that he was
involuntarily terminated and second, that the termination "implicate [s] a clear and substantial public policy."
Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 837 (Utah 1992).

Heslop v. Bank of

As the materials before the

District Court demonstrate, plaintiff could establish neither of
these elements.
1.

The Undisputed Material Facts Before the District
Court Show that Plaintiff Resigned Prom His Employment.

In their affidavits

supporting

their Motion

for Summary

Judgment, defendants established that plaintiff was not discharged
but instead resigned from his employment. In 1986, defendant David
Williams was General Manager of the Montek Division of E-Systems.
R.478 (Affidavit of David A. Williams 1 1). During 1984, 1985 and
1986 the Montek Division undertook a number of organization and
cost-cutting initiatives to improve Division performance.

One of

the organizational changes being considered was the reassignment of
the traffic and receiving function from the materials organization,
which was managed by the plaintiff, to the manufacturing organization.

R.479 (Id. 1 4 ) .

-27-

On June 18, 1986, a meeting was held to review the progress of
this initiative and to discuss it among the involved parties.

In

addition to Mr. Williams, the meeting was attended by Mr. Jim
Cocke, the Vice President of Finance, who was the plaintiff's
supervisor.

Also at the meeting were two other Directors for the

Company, including Mr. Ed Head, Director of Manufacturing. R.47980 (Id. 1 5) .
When it became apparent in the meeting that a decision would
likely be made to reassign the shipping and receiving function to
the manufacturing department, the plaintiff suddenly embarked on a
lengthy monologue on the contributions that he had made to the
Division and on his superior management capabilities.

During the

course of his monologue, plaintiff became very hostile and abusive.
He suggested that the management of the Division was incompetent
and that he was much better qualified

to perform management

functions than those presently given the responsibility.

His

immediate supervisor, Mr. Jim Cocke, cautioned him several times to
refrain from personal attacks and to concentrate on the issues at
hand; Mr. Cocke indicated to plaintiff that his behavior was
insubordinate and inappropriate.

Instead of responding to Mr.

Cocke's suggestions, plaintiff continued to be abusive and hostile,
at which time Mr. Williams ended the meeting, indicating that we
would address resolution of the issues in a separate meeting.
R.480-81 (Id. 1 6) 2 1
21

Plaintiff's own account of this meeting in his deposition
does not materially differ from the foregoing. He acknowledged in
his deposition that (1) during the course of the meeting, plaintiff
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Later the same day, Mr. Penney requested a meeting with Mr.
Cocke, who invited Mr. Buchanan, Employee Relations Director, to
attend the meeting as well.

At that meeting, the plaintiff

presented to Mr. Cocke a memorandum entitled "Letter of Resignation."

R.481-82 (Id. 1 8) .

It is undisputed that the plaintiff

drafted the Letter of Resignation and that he submitted it to Mr.
Cocke.

Id.

That letter lists a number of demands for support

which plaintiff states he "must have as a minimum."

The Letter of

Resignation goes on to state:
"I hereby submit my resignation in advance if I cannot
layout and implement a scheduled plan to reduce division
cost to a level that we pre-establish. The effective
date of my resignation is
.
If you elect not to fill in today's date, I will be glad
to discuss the plan, with supporting facts and documents
at your convenience." R.471, 585.
Following the meeting with the plaintiff, Mr. Cocke discussed
the Letter of Resignation with Mr. Williams and Mr. Buchanan. They
jointly decided that the best course of action was to accept the
resignation as tendered, by filling in "today's date," which Mr.
Cocke did.

R.481-82 (Id. 1 8).

In his First Affidavit, apparently to avoid the effect of his
own

actions, plaintiff

refers

to

the

Letter

of

Resignation

began "debating" with Williams over the issue of the proposed
transfer, prompting Cocke, plaintiff's immediate supervisor, to
warn plaintiff that he was "talking to the General Manager," PI.
Depo. at 250; (2) during the meeting while plaintiff "was involved
in a very emotional discussion with Williams . . . [Cocke] was
interrupting . . . , trying to put on a show for Dave [Williams] , "
Id. at 255; and (3) plaintiff believed that his immediate supervisor, Mr. Cocke, "didn't know what he [Cocke] was talking about," so
plaintiff ignored Cocke's warning and continued debating with
Williams. Id. at 250.
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(attached to his First Affidavit as Exhibit F-l
"Letter of Recommendation."

R. 575-76.

(R.585)), as a

Plaintiff cannot change

the legal effect of his own actions simply by trying to rename the
document he submitted.

Nor can he turn his resignation into a

discharge simply by claiming, after the fa^t, that he did not have
"any intention to resign."

Id.

The legal effect of submitting a

Letter of Resignation with a blank date, and informing his superior
that he was free to fill in the blank date of resignation with
"today's date," was that plaintiff effectively resigned from his
job.

That is particularly true where the only alternative to

accepting

the Letter of Resignation offered

to Mr. Cocke by

plaintiff was to negotiate with plaintiff regarding what support
the plaintiff "must have as a minimum" to continue to do his job.
In sum, plaintiff's belated contention in his First Affidavit
that he was discharged instead of quitting his job created no
triable issue of fact in connection with his separation from
employment.

Therefore, plaintiff cannot make out the threshold

requirement of a claim for discharge from employment in violation
of public policy.
2.

Plaintiff Did Not Identify the Basis for Any Substantial and Important Public Policy Implicated by
His Alleged Termination.

While plaintiff's Complaint alleges he was terminated in
violation of a "Public Policy Against Fraudulent Business Activities,"

in the District

Court plaintiff

never

identified any

legislative enactments or other grounds on which this alleged
public policy would be based.

Moreover, though plaintiff appears

to claim that he was asked to participate in or facilitate fraud in
connection with two of the contracts mentioned in his Complaint, he
did not set out the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud
with particularity, as required by Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.22
In Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992)
the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that in order to prove the
tort of discharge in violation of public policy, the plaintiff must
show that the employer discharged him or her "in a manner or for a
reason that contravened a 'clear and substantial public policy' of
the state of Utah, a public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or
statutes." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966 (quoting Peterson, 832 P.2d
at 1281),

The Court explained in more detail as follows:

In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear
and substantial" to support a cause of action for discharge in
violation of public policy, one must examine the strength of
the policy as well as the extent to which it affects the
public as a whole. The very words "clear and substantial"
require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As the majority
of this court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in
a statute are not expressions of public policy. Many statutes
merely regulate conduct between private individuals or
"'impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate
fundamental public policy concerns.'" (citation omitted).
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a
statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy.
First, one must ask whether the policy in question is one of
overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the
parties only. Second one must inquire whether the public
interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that
we should place the policy beyond the reach of contract,
22

As explained below, plaintiff does not even claim he was
asked to do or participate in anything fraudulent in connection
with the General Electric contract.
Rather, he alleges he
"reported" an improper billing practice in connection with that
contract. No evidence in the record, however, supports that claim.
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thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot
modify, even when freely willing and of equal bargaining
power, (citation omitted).
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966 n.9.
Plaintiff's conclusory allegations about "fraudulent business
activities" do not satisfy the standards articulated in Retherford.
No specific public policy of "overarching

importance" against

dishonesty or misrepresentation in the business world exists.
Rather, persons and organizations in business relationships have
private, contractually enforced economic rights and interests which
they also are free to waive and compromise by agreement.

One

cannot, moreover, by inquiring into any public policy, begin to
determine what the parties may have permitted or forbidden to each
other in their private agreements.

Indeed, fraud claims arising

out of complicated contractual relationships are always intimately
connected to the private agreements or course of dealings between
the parties. Accordingly, because public policy in this area does
not supply any standards articulable and enforceable independently
of the parties' own private agreements, it should not be used as a
basis for creating a wrongful discharge cause of action.
Finally, should Utah courts ever recognize some "overarching"
public policy against business fraud or dishonesty, it should be
strictly limited to cases where actual fraud, pled with particularity and proven by clear and convincing evidence, can be made out.23

23

See Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.. 832 P.2d 62,
66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting fraud requires proof by clear and
convincing evidence).
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Plaintiff's pleading and evidence offered to the District Court
fall far short of such a showing.24
For these reasons, Count

II of plaintiff's

Complaint was

properly dismissed.
B.

In Response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff Failed to
Identify Any Triable Issues of Material Fact Precluding
Summary Dismissal of His Claim*

In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, supra, the Supreme Court identified
two additional elements of a public policy wrongful termination
claim:25
(2)

The employer must violate the pertinent public
policy "by requiring the employee to engage in
conduct violating the policy or by punishing conduct furthering the policy"; and

(3)

Violation
of
the public
policy must
be a
"substantial factor" in the plaintiff's termination.

Id., 839 P.2d at 837.

The District Court also properly dismissed

plaintiff's claim because he failed to raise any triable issue in
connection with these second two elements of a public policy claim.
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgement on Count II,
defendants offered three affidavits.

See R.472-85.

Through the

Motion and those supporting affidavits, defendants satisfied their
burden under Rule 56 to demonstrate

that no triable

issue of

24

The District Court was entitled, in this connection, to apply
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof when assessing
plaintiff's ability to prove the elements of fraud. See, Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (in ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence through "the
prism" of the party's evidentiary burden).
25

The first two elements, discussed above, are that the
plaintiff be terminated and that his termination "implicate a clear
and substantial public policy." Heslop, supra. 839 P.2d at 837.
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material fact precluded entry of judgment in defendants' favor on
Count II.

In response, plaintiff offered no admissible evidence,

but only conclusory allegations.
1.

No Triable Issue of Fact Existed in Connection with
the General Electric Contract.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgement, defendants
established the following material facts in connection with the
General Electric contract:
The contract with GE was a "firm fixed price" contract awarded
to E-Systems in 1976, under which E-Systems was to design and
manufacture earthquake shock suppressors for use in nuclear power
plants built by GE and others.

R.486 (Johnson Affidavit 1 2) .

In order to meet the lead time requirements of the customer
(GE) , E-Systems purchased mill runs of nuclear certified raw
material for use on that contract.

R.486-87 (Id. at 1 4) .

To

protect E-Systems from the risk of making these advanced purchases,
GE agreed to pay for the material.

Id.

It was understood by

E-Systems, however, that any residual material remaining at the end
of the contract would be owned by E-Systems, as it would be in any
other firm fixed price contract.

Id.

E-Systems never billed GE

for the use by E-Systems of any materials owned by GE. R.487 (Id.
at 1 6). In other words, E-Systems never double-billed GE for any
materials.

Id.

Neither plaintiff nor Still ever mentioned the issue of GE
being double-billed to anyone, including Johnson and Williams, the
General Manager.
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Affidavit 1 10) . Mr. Still had no responsibility for pricing or
invoicing on the GE contract.

R.487 (Johnson Affidavit 1 5).

The events leading up to plaintiff's resignation had nothing
to do with the GE contract. R.479-82 (Affidavit of David Williams
11 4-8) .
Plaintiff's only evidentiary response to these material facts
in the District Court are paragraphs 16 and 17 of the First
Affidavit of William V. Penney.
wholly

conclusory

statements

See R.576, 539-40.
in

those

paragraphs,

Plaintiff's
that

some

materials purchased for the GE contract were "knowingly, illegally
and/or improperly used" by E-Systems and that he reported this
"knowing, illegal and/or improper use" to someone at E-Systems did
not raise any issue of material fact.

Plaintiff's statements in

his First Affidavit are wholly lacking in foundation, because, as
he conceded in his deposition, he had no personal knowledge of the
General Electric contract and did not actually "report" any alleged
impropriety to anyone.26
26

According to plaintiff's deposition testimony, he has no
personal knowledge of whether General Electric was, in fact,
"double-billed" for any material on any General Electric contract.
PI. depo. at 402-08, 414.
Indeed, plaintiff admitted in his
deposition that he knows virtually nothing about the General
Electric contract.
Id.
Plaintiff's Affidavit also lacks any
foundation on this issue precisely because, as he acknowledged in
his deposition, he did not "report" any alleged impropriety
regarding the General Electric contract to anyone.
Rather,
plaintiff's testimony was that Mr. Still allegedly told plaintiff
that he thought General Electric was being billed for material it
had already paid for. According to plaintiff's testimony, after
Mr. Still allegedly told him this, he stated to Still: "that [is]
an extremely dangerous-type situation especially in that product
line." Plaintiff's depo. at 415. Plaintiff never said or did
anything else in response to these alleged statements by Still.
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The

District

Court

thus

properly

concluded

that

"These

statements are purely conclusory and Mr. Penney has offered no
admissible evidence to support these conclusions."

R.591.

See

Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916 (Utah 1991) (pro
se plaintiff's conclusory statements in affidavit created no issue
of material fact regarding his public pclicy discharge claim),27
2.

No Triable Issue of Fact Existed in Connection with
the Northrop Contract.

Plaintiffs' claims regarding the Northrop contract also fail
because,

in

response

to

the

admissible

evidence

offered

by

defendants through their Motion, plaintiff again responded only
with conclusory allegations.

In connection with the Northrop

contract, defendants established, inter alia, the following facts:
In 1985, Northrop had a contract with the United States Air
Force to build an aircraft.

In 1984, E-Systems submitted a

proposal to Northrop which anticipated a firrr, fixed price subcontract

under which

E-Systems

was

tc build

an actuator

(a

hydraulic device used to operate moving parts on an aircraft).

In

May 1985, Northrop awarded the subcontract to E-Systems for the
supply of actuators, and E-Systems commenced work on that contract.
R.487-88 (Johnson Affidavit 1 7).
The Northrop Contract was bid and subsequently signed as a
firm fixed price contract in May 1985. R.487-88, 518 (Id. 11 7, 9;
27

See also, Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983)
(plaintiff's statements in affidavit were conclusory in form and
accordingly not admissible in evidence and could not defeat summary
judgement motion); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985)
(affidavit reflecting affiant's opinions and conclusions insufficient to raise issue of material fact precluding summary judgment).
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Exhibit A thereto, document control no. P200354).

Under a firm

fixed price contract, the ultimate contract price is agreed to and
fixed at the time the contract is entered into.
Affidavit 1 10) .

R.488 (Johnson

In contrast, under a cost-plus contract, the

price is determined based on a contractor's actual cost, plus an
agreed-upon profit margin.

Id.

Under a firm fixed price contract, sourcing changes (e.g..
purchasing contract items from outside vendors rather than making
them in-plant) are customarily made by the seller (here, E-Systems)
without notice to the government. Sourcing changes have no impact
on the firm fixed price charged by the seller because, regardless
of the source of manufacture, the seller is always paid only the
firm fixed price on which the parties to the contract originally
agreed.

R.489 (Id. at 1 12).

Under the terms of the Northrop Contract, E-Systems was free
to either make the parts for the "actuators" within its own plant
or purchase them from outside vendors, so long as the other
contract requirements
were met.

(e.g. technical performance and schedule)

R.489, 520

(Id. at 1 11 and Exhibit

"A" thereto,

document control no. P200356).
When the Northrop contract was originally bid in 19 84, certain
parts were planned to be made by E-Systems within its own plant;
however, as the design of the program evolved, sourcing was
reviewed and revised, and some of the sourcing for such parts was
changed from being made by E-Systems in its own plant to being
purchased from outside vendors.
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R.489

(Id. at 1 12) .

Such

sourcing changes are customarily made in order to accommodate
technical considerations, schedule, shop loading, cost, etc, of the
contractor.

Id.

Northrop was fully aware of all sourcing changes made under
the Northrop contract because in approximately March 198 7, Northrop
representatives audited the costs associated with the Northrop
contract in order to establish a negotiation position for subsequent requirements it entered into to purchase more actuators from
E-Systems.

R.490 (Id. at 1 13).

In July 1988, E-Systems properly invoiced Northrop for the
tooling in accordance with E-Systems' government property control
systems, which was set up to specifically comply with Federal
Acquisition Regulations.

R.490, 522-25 <Ld. at 1 14 and Exhibit

"B" thereto) . Both the Federal Government's Property Administrator
and Northrop's Property Administrator have audited and signed off
on E-Systems' tooling list every year since 1986.

R490 (Id. at

1 15) .
In response to this admissible evidence regarding the Northrop
contract, plaintiff again responded only with foundationless,
conclusory allegations that are not admissible evidence and raised
no triable issue of material fact in the District Court.28
28

It is

Plaintiffs' First Affidavit simply declares that: "Defendants' involuntary termination of Plaintiff was, at least in part, a
result of Plaintiff's informing Defendant E-Systems' management
that Defendants, contrary to the terms of the Northrop Contract and
without Northrop's knowledge or consent, subcontracted out the work
of producing actuators for Northrop, knowingly, illegally and/or
improperly made representations to Northrop that certain of said
actuators had been manufactured, and knowingly, illegally and/or
improperly accepted progress payments, based on said representa65154
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not surprising that plaintiff's allegations are conclusory and lack
foundation, because the auditing and invoicing of the Northrop
contract did not even occur until 1987 and 1988, long after June
1986 when plaintiff's employment with E-Systems ended.
(Johnson Affidavit 11 13, 14) .29
the record evidence

relating

See R.490

Further, absolutely nothing in

to events preceding plaintiff's

resignation could support an inference that his employment was
terminated because of any alleged improprieties in connection with
the Northrop contract.

See R.479-82 (Affidavit of David Williams

11 4-8) .
3.

No Triable Issue of Fact Existed in Connection with
the Hazeltine Contract.

With respect to the Hazeltine contract, defendants established, in support of their Motion, the following facts:
1.

In 1984, the Federal Aviation Administration ("F.A.A.")

awarded Hazeltine a contract to develop certain electronic airplane
guidance equipment.

R.473-74 (Ausman Affidavit 1 3). In January

1984, Hazeltine awarded E-Systems a subcontract to build precision
tions, for certain tools necessary for making actuators when said
tools had not yet been manufactured." First Affidavit of William
V. Penney, 1 18; R. 576-77.
29

Moreover, in his deposition plaintiff acknowledged that
he has virtually no personal knowledge about the Northrop contract.
PI. depo at 424-29. Plaintiff has no personal knowledge of when
the Northrop contract was awarded (id. at 424-25), whether it was
a firm fixed price or a cost-plus contract (id. at 425, 427), or
whether E-Systems ever informed Northrop that the tooling and tools
were being purchased from outside vendors (.id. at 428) .
In
addition, plaintiff admitted he had no personal knowledge of
whether Northrop ever paid for tools or tooling that were not
actually obtained for the contract by E-Systems and, in fact, does
not believe anyone at E-Systems was trying to cheat Northrop on the
"tooling" work done under the contract. Id. at 438, 435.
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distance measuring equipment ("PDME") for Hazeltine's use on its
contract with the F.A.A., and E-Systems started work on the PDME.
Id.

At that same time (January 19 84), the contract price for E-

Systems' work (approximately $11 million) was set.

Id.

The Hazeltine contract was bid, negotiated, and signed as a
firm fixed price contract. R.474 (Id. at 1 4) . Under a firm fixed
price contract, the ultimate contract price is agreed to and fixed
at the time the contract is entered into. R.474 (Id. at 1 5) . The
contract price stays the same unless there is a change in the scope
of the work to be performed under contract. There was no change in
the scope of the work to be performed by E-Systems under the
Hazeltine Contract.

R.474

(Id. at 1 6) .

Although it was a

development contract and the bill of material changed, thereby
increasing the cost of certain items to E-Systems, the price never
changed

(i.e., this just resulted in a decrease of E-Systems'

profit margin).

Id.

In connection with the Hazeltine contract, plaintiff claims
that Williams had both plaintiff and another company "price" a part
of the electronic materials to be used in that contract. R.13-14.
This process involves creating a "bill of materials" that itemizes
the cost of materials needed for the contract.

Plaintiff alleged

Williams told him that he wanted to use the material costs set out
in a "bill of materials" by the other firm (which were higher) for
negotiations with Hazeltine and the F.A.A. and use plaintiff's
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costs for the materials

(which were lower) for division budget

reporting to the Corporation.

Id.30

In response to defendants' specific facts, however, plaintiff
again offered only conclusory allegations.
Affidavit of William V. Penney H1 19-21).
foundation

in the record

See R.577

(First

There is absolutely no

for these statements by plaintiff,

Further, conclusory allegations about obtaining "funny numbers" to
use "knowingly, illegally, and/or improperly" fall far short of the
specific facts and clear and convincing proof required for a
showing of fraud.31

See Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,

832 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting fraud requires proof
by clear and convincing evidence).
In addition, plaintiff's allegations also do not make sense in
light of the fact that the Hazeltine contract was a firm fixed
price contract.

In such a contract, the price cannot be changed

unless the scope of the contract is changed.

Yet it is undisputed

that the scope of the Hazeltine contract never changed, nor did the
price. Moreover, the contract price for the Hazeltine contract was
set in 1984. Therefore, in order for E-Systems somehow to benefit

30

Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition, however, that he
did not believe, at the time he allegedly spoke to Williams about
the Hazeltine contract, that Williams or any one else at E-Systems
was intentionally violating any law or regulation. Plaintiff's
depo at 449-50.
31

Again, it is not surprising that plaintiff resorts to
conclusory allegations because, as he acknowledged in his deposition, he has no personal knowledge about whether anyone at
E-Systems ever did commit fraud, and he does not actually believe
anyone at E-Systems intended to commit fraud. PI. depo. at 314-16,
435, 438.
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from the conduct which plaintiff apparently alleges, that conduct
would have to have occurred before the contract was awarded to
E-Systems

in 1983, and not in 1986, as plaintiff

apparently

asserts.
Finally, plaintiff's

allegations

regarding

the Hazeltine

contract also fail because, as with the other two contracts, they
were entirely unrelated to the reasons plaintiff's employment with
E-Systems ended.32

See e.g.. Hamman 910. F.2d 1417, 1420-21 (7th

Cir. 1990) (in public policy wrongful discharge case, plaintiff
must prove causal connection with more evidence than showing of her
refusal to act, her discharge, and the timing between the two
events).
The District Court properly concluded that these conclusory
allegations failed to raise any triable issue of material fact in
connection with Defendants' Motion.

32

Note also that plaintiff cannot even maintain that the
transfer of the traffic function from his department to the
manufacturing department, which was the subject of the meeting
immediately preceding his resignation, was an improper decision.
Plaintiff conceded that the General Manager, David Williams, had
the right to make that decision. PI. depo. 245-46. Plaintiff also
acknowledged that the transfer of the traffic function was a
"management decision" about which reasonable people could disagree.
Id. at 338. Further, a transfer of some functions away from the
plaintiff's department would appear to be exactly what was needed,
given his complaints about working excessive overtime in
plaintiff's Letter of Resignation.
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4.

The
District
Court
Also
Properly
Rejected
Plaintiff's Belated and Conclusory Allegations
Regarding Two Other Alleged Projects.

In his February 16, 1993 First Affidavit, plaintiff also
attempted to assert for the first time that his employment with ESystems was terminated because of "Plaintiff's refusal to participate in the amoral and illegal KAL Project." R.577. Plaintiff also
asserted for the first time that his "involuntary termination by
Defendants was, at least in part, a result of Plaintiff's unwillingness to overlook or ignore Defendants' knowing, illegal and/or
improper conduct regarding the Dolphin Castings." R.577-78.
These belated and conclusory allegations were not made in
plaintiff's Complaint or prior to the filing of plaintiff's First
Affidavit, after defendants' Motion had already been submitted for
decision and the Court had, in its first Minute Entry, granted
defendants' Motion.33
The District Court properly concluded that these allegations
also lacked any foundation and did not create any triable issue of
fact in connection with plaintiff's loss of employment at ESystems.
For

the

reasons,

the

District

Court

properly

granted

defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed plaintiff's
public policy claim with prejudice.

33

Throughout his lengthy deposition, in which plaintiff
testified at length regarding his claims, plaintiff never testified
that he was terminated because of either of these projects; he
never even mentioned either project.
65154

-43-

III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SET
THE DISCOVERY CUTOFF DATE.
On June 19, 1992, more than two years after plaintiff filed
his Complaint, the District Court, on its own motion, ordered that
a scheduling conference be held on August 3, 1992. R.18, 414. On
August

3,

1992, a

scheduling

conference

was

held.

R.423„

Plaintiff and counsel for defendants attended the hearing.

The

District Court discussed relevant cutoff dates with the parties and
set a discovery cutoff of December 1, 1992.

R.423

The Appellate Court must assume that the District Court
properly exercised its discretion when it set the discovery cutoff
date unless the record clearly shows to the contrary.

Donohue v.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987);
Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) .

Furthermore, considerable weight should be given to the

District Court's setting of the discovery cutoff date due to the
District Court's close involvement with the parties and total
circumstances of the case.

Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702

(Utah 1974) .
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to point to any
evidence in the record which shows the District Court abused its
discretion when it set the discovery cutoff date.
Plaintiff's allegation that he has not had adequate opportunity to complete discovery is untrue.

Plaintiff had from June 15,

1990 to December 1, 1992 (nearly two-and-one-half years) to conduct
discovery.

See R.18, 423. In fact, plaintiff conducted extensive

discovery during that time.

Specifically, plaintiff served on

defendants two separate sets of interrogatories and requests for
production of documents, the first of which consisted of "87
separate detailed interrogatories and 31 detailed requests for
production of documents."

Plaintiff's Brief at 44; R.21; R.306.

Defendants fully responded to both sets of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents.
Plaintiff

argues

that

the

R.68; R.366.34

District

Court's

reasonably

extending the time to complete discovery would not have prejudiced
defendants; however, at the Scheduling Conference, the District
Court did reasonably extend the time to complete discovery - he
gave plaintiff an additional four months to complete discovery.
R.423.
Plaintiff's references to his illness, pro se status, and move
to Texas fail to support his argument.

Plaintiff was represented

and assisted by local counsel for nearly one-and-one-half years.
R.2, 156, 325, 390. Also, plaintiff maintains a local address and
apparently spends a significant amount of time in the Salt Lake
34

In his brief, plaintiff alleges that defendants did not
properly respond to plaintiff's interrogatories and document
requests and failed to make themselves available for deposition.
Plaintiff's Brief at 48-49.
These allegations are conclusory,
completely unsupported, and simply wrong.
Defendants fully
responded to both sets of plaintiff interrogatories and requests
for production of documents, R.68, 3 66, and both defendant
Buchanan's and defendant Williams' depositions were scheduled by
plaintiff while he was still represented by counsel, but were rescheduled at the request of plaintiff's counsel and were never renoticed. In any event, the appropriate method for addressing these
allegations is through a motion to compel under Utah R. Civ. P. 37.
Contrary to plaintiff's representation, he never served upon
defendants a motion to compel discovery. In fact, plaintiff never
even raised these allegations before the trial court; therefore,
they should not be considered by the Appellate Court.
See
discussion above at § I.A.
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City area.

R.592.

Furthermore, plaintiff does not claim that he

has been incapacitated at all times since the date he commenced
this law suit or since the date of the scheduling conference.
Indeed, his behavior since receiving defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment

indicate

that

despite

the

foregoing

considerations,

plaintiff has been quite active in pursuing his lawsuit.

See,

e.g. , R.542-589, 597-605, 613-622; Docketing Statement; Plaintiff's
Brief.
In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
setting the discovery cutoff date; therefore, the District Court's
action should be affirmed.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
COMPLETE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL PREPARATION.
On February 16, 1993, after all of the allowed briefing

related

to defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment

had been

completed, see Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(1); R.425-525, 530,
and two months after defendants filed a Notice to Submit for
Decision, R.527, the District Court directed that a Minute Entry be
made in which it granted the Motion for Summary Judgment.
40.

On the same day (February 16, 1993), plaintiff filed:

R.53 9(1) a

Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Trial
Preparation, R.542; and (2) a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
R.545.

On February 18, 1993, defendants filed a Response to

Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance and for Leave to Complete
Discovery.
65154

R.593.

On that same day
-46"

(February 18, 1993) the

District Court made a second a Minute Entry reaffirming its earlier
ruling granting the Motion for Summary Judgment.

R.590-91.

As noted above, the Appellate Court must assume that the
District Court properly exercised its discretion when it refused to
grant plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time unless the record
clearly shows to the contrary.

Donohue. 748 P.2d at 1068; Matter

of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d at 433.
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to point to any
admissible evidence in the record which clearly shows the District
Court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's Motion for
Extension of Time.
Plaintiff's argument that the District Court never entered a
ruling granting or denying his Motion for Extension is misplaced.
There was no need

for the District

plaintiff's Motion was untimely.

Court

to do so because

See discussion above.

Further-

more, plaintiff has not cited to any authority for the proposition
implicit in his argument that the District Court must make a formal
ruling on all untimely motions.
Plaintiff's argument related to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) also is
misplaced because plaintiff never moved for additional time under
this rule,35 and the cases which plaintiff cites in support of this
argument are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.36
35

Even had plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) ,
he could not have meet his burden of showing that he had not had
adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. See discussion above.
36

See Strand v. Assoc. Student of U. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191
(Utah 1977) (the plaintiff only had one month to conduct discovery
in general and four days to conduct discovery related to the

In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time; therefore, the
District Court's action should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request the
Court of Appeals to affirm: (1) the District Court's granting of
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (2) the District
Court's granting of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; (3)
the District Court's

entering

of the Scheduling

Order which

mandated that all discovery be completed by December 31, 1992; (4)
the District Court's refusal to grant plaintiff's Motion for
Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Trial Preparation; and
(5) any other judgments, decisions or orders of the District Court
from which plaintiff has appealed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [b

day of August, 1993.

£/f&~s
DAVID A. ANDERSON '
PAUL E. DAME
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

affidavit upon which the motion was based, and the plaintiff filed
an affidavit which conformed with the requirements of Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(f)); Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984) (the defendant
had not responded to plaintiff's discovery requests, and the
plaintiff filed an affidavit which met the requirements of Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(f)); Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376 (Utah
1977) (the party requesting more time to conduct discovery had
received no response to his discovery requests).
65154

-48-

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEES

68067

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

B.

COPIES OF THOSE FACTS OF THE RECORD THAT ARE OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE DETERMINATION OF THIS
APPEAL.

C.

COPY OF ORDER AND STATEMENT OF PROPOSED CHANGES
TO THE RECORD.

68067

Tab A

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

1.

29 U.S.C.A. § 793(b) (West Supp. 1993).
(b) Administrative enforcement; complaints; investigations; departmental action.
If any individual with a disability believes any contractor
has failed or refused to comply with the provisions of a
contract with the United States, relating to employment of
individuals with disabilities, such individual may file a
complaint with the Department of Labor. The Department
shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take
such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant,
consistent with the terms of such contract and the laws and
regulations applicable thereto.

2.

29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1993).
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations.
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States, as defined in Section 706(8) of this title,
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service. The head of each such
agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the amendments to this section made by the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation
shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of
the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier
than the thirtieth day after the date on which such
regulation is so submitted to such committees.

68067

3.

29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (A) (West Supp. 1993).
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or
day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services, or (B) . . .

4.

29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1993).
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as such documents and
instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter,

5.

29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985).
(a) Supersedure; effective date.
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in Section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under Section 1003(b) of this title. This section
shall take effect on January 1, 1975.

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) (Michie Supp. 1993).
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice:
(a)(i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or
promote, or to discharge, demote, terminate any person,
or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in
matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and
conditions of employment against any person otherwise
qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion,
national origin, or handicap. No applicant nor
candidate for any job or position may be considered
"otherwise qualified," unless he possesses the
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education, training, ability, moral character,
integrity, disposition to work, adherence to reasonable
rules and regulations, and other job related
qualifications required by an employer for any
particular job, job classification, or position to be
filled or created;
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Michie Supp. 1993).
The procedures contained in this section are the
exclusive remedy under state law for employment
discrimination based upon race, color, sex,
retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancyrelated conditions, age, religion, national origin, or
handicap.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (Michie 1988).
Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or
employee - Occupational Disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law
or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow,
children, parents, dependents, next of kin," heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or
death, in any way contracted, sustained aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because
of arising out of his employment, and no action at law
may be maintained against an employer or against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon
any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing
in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or
his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial
commission of Utah for compensation in those cases
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease
Disability Act, as amended.
3

Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(2) (b)
(Michie 1993)•
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed
fact shall be stated in separate numoered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed.
All
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the opposing party's statement*
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(1)
1993) •
(1)

(Michie

Filing and service of motions and memoranda.

(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions,
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other
documents relied upon in support of the motion.
Memoranda
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages
in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the
court on ex-parte application.
If an ex-parte application
is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application
shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if
the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed
five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion.
The
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.

4

If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit
the matter to the court for decision as provided in
paragraph (1)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum.
The moving party may serve and
file a reply memorandum within five days after service of
the responding party's memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be
in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall
contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

WILLIAM V. PENNEY,

CASE NO. 900903522 CV

Plaintiff,

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

vs.
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS,
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN,
Defendants.

On February 28, 1992 the Court denied plaintiff's Motion
to Disqualify Counsel.

The Court recalls that it instructed

Counsel for defendant to prepare an order reflecting the Court's
ruling.

In reviewing the file the Court notes that said Order

has not yet been submitted for the Court's signature.
In

addition

the

Court

has

before

it

a

Withdrawal of Counsel filed by plaintiff's Counsel.

Motion

for

The Court

has granted said Motion and has signed the Order submitted in
connection with the Motion for Withdrawal but hereby instructs
Counsel, David K. Isom, to serve upon plaintiff a notice to

r

i<\ \
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appoint Counsel or appear in person consistent with our rules of
practice.
DATED this

day of March, 1992.

0U03(J2

PENNEY V. E-SYSTEMS
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MINUTE ENTRY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

03>

-^p-

day of March, 1992:

David K. Isom
J. Preston Stieff
DAVID K. ISOM & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1680 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David A. Anderson
Paul E. Dame
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
P. O, Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
William V. Penney
Plaintiff
709 West Busk, Suite A-101
Rockwell, Texas
75087

^ )<? ^ m tc,\

yk'&fo^
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Thlr- Edicts' District
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DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081)
PAUL E. DAME (5683)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

WILLIAM V. PENNEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

)

E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
)
corporation, DAVID A.
)
WILLIAMS, ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, )
)
Defendants.
)

Civil No. 900903522CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

* * * * * * * *

Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Counsel came on for
hearing before the Court on February 28, 1992.

Plaintiff was

represented by David K. Isom and J. Preston Stieff of David K.
Isom & Associates, P.C., and defendants were represented by David
A. Anderson

of Parsons

Behle

& Latimer.

The

Court having

reviewed the memoranda, affidavits and other materials submitted
by the parties, and having heard the arguments of counsel, now
being fully advised in the premises, and having issued its oral

ruling denying plaintiff's Motion on the grounds that plaintiff
has failed to prove that Parsons Behle & Latimer formerly represented him or that confidential information was transmitted to
Parsons Behle & Latimer by plaintiff, and the Court having further concluded that plaintiff has waived his right to bring the
instant Motion by filing it untimely,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's
Motion to Disqualify Counsel should be and is hereby denied.
ENTERED this ^S

day of March, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL to the following on this /
of March, 1992:
David K. Isom, Esq.
J. Preston Stieff, Esq.
Suite 1680 Eaglegate Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1006

/U€&~/
DAA/022892A
-2-

day

>:>r,ci

JUL 1 0 1S92
DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081)
PAUL E. DAME (5683)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

WILLIAM V. PENNEY,
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS,
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN,

Civil No. 900903522CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

Defendants' Motion
filed on September 25, 1991.

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

was

After an order granting plaintiff

additional time to conduct discovery, dated February

10, 1992,

defendants' Motion came on for hearing before the Court on June
19, 1992, with David A. Anderson and Paul E. Dame appearing for
the

defendants.

On

June

18,

1992,

the

Court

received

a

telecopied letter and Notice of Appearance Pro Se from plaintiff.
In his

letter, plaintiff

requested

hearing

on defendants' Motion.

the Court to postpone the

After

considering

plaintiff's

I'OOH

request, the Court noted that:
himself;

(2)

plaintiff

has

(1) plaintiff is now representing
not

requested

additional

time

to

retain other counsel; and (3) there is no indication of when, if
ever, plaintiff will be ready to attend a hearing on defendant's
Motion.

Accordingly, the Court elected to proceed with the hear-

ing on defendants' Motion.
Having read defendants' supporting memorandum and affidavits, and now being

fully advised

in the premises, and the

Court having issued its oral ruling granting defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendants' Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment

should be and is hereby granted; and
2.

Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (breach of pub-

lic policy against discrimination against disabled), Third Cause
of Action

(breach of implied covenant of good

faith and fair

dealing), Fourth Cause of Action (breach of contract), and Fifth
Cause of Action (infliction of emotional distress) should be and
are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

-2-

hli°^~ i

lis
Entered this

(U

day of ^l*JUy
^|U>K 1992
BY THE COURT:

HON. FRANK G. NOEL w >f^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid,

a copy

of the

foregoing

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following on this<££_
day of June, 1992.
William V. Penney
709 West Rusk, Suite A101
Rockwall, TX 75087

£/*£-<

PAUL E. DAME
PED/061992A
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PENNEY, WILLAIM V

:
PLAINTIFF,
:

-VS-

:

E-SYSTEMS, INC

:
:

SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE
CASE NO.

900903522 CV

HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL

DEFENDANT.
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON AUGUST 3, 1992
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MARCH 1, 1993 AT 10:00 A.M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 03 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR JURY TRIAL. COUNSEL ARE TO
SUBMIT AN AGREED SET OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COURT BY
. OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED
SEPARATELY.
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
DEC 1, 1992
5.
ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY JAN 4, 1992
6.
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY
7.
A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON
FEBRUARY 22, 1993 AT 8:30 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING.
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PERPARE AN
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT'. /"^.
DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF .-AUGUST,' 1992. „
I ' / /

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE.

1)004-3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL,
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING:

PENNEY, WILLIAM V.
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
709 W. RUSK, SUITE A101
P.O. BOX 11898
ROCKWALL TX 75087

DATED THIS 5 .\A

ANDERSON, DAVID A.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
50 WEST BROADWAY #400
SALT LAKE CITY

DAY OF Clo

If

UT 84147

19 <JX

Lir c'«:r^.
DEPUTY CLERK
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

William V. Penney,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:
vs.
:
:
E-Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
:
David A. Williams and Alfred B. Buchanan, :
Defendants.

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 900903522 CV
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

Now before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs
second cause of action.

The Court has reviewed the substantial materials submitted in

connection with this Motion including memos, affidavits, news clippings, magazine articles and
other matter submitted by the plaintiff and now rules as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff simply has not appropriately established in
the record a question of fact on his second cause of action that would allow the Court to submit
that matter to the jury.

Plaintiff has conducted essentially no discovery and the materials

submitted in opposition to the Motion do not appear to the Court to create questions of fact
sufficient to overcome a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Much of the information contained in Mr. Penney's rather lengthy response is not
information of which he has personal knowledge.

The news clippings, magazine article,

brochures and seminar advertisements of course are not admissible and do not in any way
support Mr. Penney's claim.

On the other hand several affidavits have been filed by the

defendants which support their position both as to the fraud claims and their position that Mr.
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Penney resigned from employment rather than being terminated.
Throughout a large portion of this litigation Mr. Penney has not been represented by
Counsel and the Court in recognition of that fact has given Mr. Penney the benefit of the doubt
on occasions, has been patient in Mr. Penney's efforts to get his case prepared so that he could
go to trial, but the Court feels that it simply must apply the rule of law in the final analysis that
is applied to all litigants and must require that Mr. Penney establish in an appropriate manner
in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure facts on the record that establish a genuine issue
of material facts. In the opinion of the Court Mr. Peimey's submittals in response to the
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment fails to do so. Accordingly, defendants' Motion is
granted.
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this

U —tiay of February, 1993
\

Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge

uij07» »0
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this jin

day of February, 1993.

William V. Penney
Plaintiff Pro Se
709 West Rusk, Suite A101
Rockwall, Texas 75087

WILLIAM V. PENNEY
PLAINTIFF PRO SE
2333 EAST CLIFT SWALLOW DRIVE
SANDY, UT
84093

David A. Anderson
Paul E. Dame

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorney for Defendants
P. O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

William V. Penney,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:
:
:

CASE NO: 900903522 CV
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

E-Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
David A. Williams and Alfred B. Buchanan,
Defendants.
The Court in this matter has previously ruled granting defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on plaintiffs second cause of action stating that the plaintiff had not established a
triable issue of fact. Mr. Penney had submitted news clippings, magazine articles, etc., but no
affidavits or any other admissible evidence creating fact issues to submit to the jury.
Subsequent to the Court's ruling on that matter and subsequent to it's preparation of it's
Minute Entry granting the Motion for Summary Judgment the Court received from Mr. Penney
certain other information including a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment together with William Penney's first
Affidavit and an affidavit of Dr. Allen J. Meril. Even though the materials submitted by Mr.
Penney are not allowed under our rules inasmuch as the moving parties reply memo (in this case
the defendants' reply memo) is the final pleading to be filed in connection with its Motion,
nevertheless the Court has reviewed Mr. Penney's materials and will permit their filing in
connection with the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
After a review of Mr. Penney's affidavit the Court is still of the opinion that triable issue

"OODfiO
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of fact has not been raised by Mr. Penney. Mr. Penney's affidavit contains certain paragraphs
where Mr. Penney expresses his belief that he was terminated as a result of his refusal to engage
in certain questionable activities at the company and as a result of informing management of
certain questionable activities by other employees. These statements are purely conclusiory and
Mr. Penney has offered no admissible evidence to support these conclusions. The Court is still
of the opinion that Mr. Penney has not raised a triable issue of fact in this matter and
considering all of the admissible evidence that Mr. Penney has established on the record it would
still require the jury to purely speculate as to the reason for Mr. Penney's termination.
Accordingly, the Court reaffirms its earlier ruling granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Dated this J ^ r f o y of February, 1993.

Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge

U0059.L
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this

/p

day of February, 1993.

William V. Penney
Plaintiff Pro Se
709 West Rusk, Suite A101
Rockwall, Texas 75087
William V. Penney
Plaintiff Pro Se
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84093
David A. Anderson
Paul E. Dame
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorney for Defendants
P. O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898

•'•rr:r\2

DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081)
PAUL E. DAME (5683)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•

•

•

WILLIAM V. PENNEY,

•

*

•

•

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

•

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS '
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
)
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, )
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN,
)
)
Defendants.
)
*

•

•

•

•

Civil No. 900903522CV
Judge Frank G. Noel
•

•

•

On December 31, 1992, defendants, through their attorney
David A. Anderson, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on
plaintiff's second cause of action, all previous causes of action
having been dismissed by the Court in response to defendants' prior
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After defendants filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff William Penney, acting as
attorney pro se. submitted materials, including an affidavit, in
opposition

to

that Motion

and

defendants

submitted

a Reply

oooc.o

Memorandum.

The Court having reviewed the materials submitted by

the parties that relate to defendants' Motion, and having issued
its ruling on the Motion set forth in its Minute Entry dated
February 16, 1993, and having issued its further ruling set forth
in the Court's Minute Entry dated February 18, 1993, and being
fully advised regarding the parties' positions on the subject
Motion, and good cause appear therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment should be and is hereby granted and plaintiff's Second
Cause of Action ("Violation of Public Policy Against Fraudulent
Business Activities") is hereby dismissed wit£ prejudice,
ENTERED this 7

day of

/ rj/f^C

Vv

BY THE COURT: ^ ' ^ 1

1993

X

'

HON. FRANK G. NOEL

-2-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following at the two
addresses indicated on this ^cO

day of February, 1993:

William V. Penney
709 West Rusk, Suite A101
Rockwall, TX 75087
William V. Penney
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84093
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DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081)
PAUL E. DAME (5683)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

WILLIAM V. PENNEY,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS,
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN,

Civil No. 900903522CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

The Court having issued its Order Granting Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 10, 1992, and having
thereafter issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, which Orders dismissed with prejudice all claims in
plaintiff's Complaint herein against defendants,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff
should be and is hereby entered, dismissing plaintiff's action,

000^3

including

all

claims

asserted

therein, with prejudice,

prevailing parties, defendants are awarded their costs herein.
ENTERED t h ii ss

day of

-2-

L

1993.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the
following at the two addresses indicated on this ^/J

day of

February, 1993:
William V. Penney
709 West Rusk, Suite A101
Rockwall, TX 75087
William V. Penney
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84093
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DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081)
PAUL E. DAME (5683)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

WILLIAM V. PENNEY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND STATEMENT OF
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE
RECORD

vs.
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS,
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN,
Defendants.

Civil No. 900903522CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

* * * * * * * *

Defendants' Motion To File Plaintiff's Deposition and to
Modify the Judgment came on for hearing before the Court on July 9,
1993.

Plaintiff William V. Penney, who was present by telephone,

represented himself, and Defendants were represented by David A.
Anderson and Paul E. Dame of Parsons Behle & Latimer.

At the

hearing, through colloquy with counsel, the Court determined that
counsel
63971

for defendants had

inadvertently

failed to file the

original transcript of the deposition of the plaintiff, even though
counsel had filed on September 25, 1991, their Motion to Publish
the Plaintiff's Deposition, which was granted by the Court.

The

Court further determined that courtesy copies of the pages of the
deposition relied upon by defendants were provided to the Court in
connection with defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
It is the practice of the Court to consider the pages thus
submitted prior to ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court is not inclined to use Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to deal with this situation. Rather, the
Court, on its own initiative, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(h),
and in order to clarify what actually occurred in the trial court,
makes this Statement and Order.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The original transcript of the Plaintiff's deposi-

tion may be filed as of July 9, 1993;
2.

The original transcript of the Plaintiff's deposi-

tion may be unsealed as previously provided by the Court's granting
of the Defendants' September 25, 1991 Motion to Publish the
Plaintiff's Deposition;
3.

63971

Defendants' Motion under Rule 60(b) is denied; and

4.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h),

the record should be clarified to show that the original transcript
of plaintiff's deposition was inadvertently not filed but that, in
connection

with

their

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment,

defendants provided the Court with courtesy copies of the pages of
the Plaintiff's deposition on which they relied in support of chat
Motion, and it is the Court's practice to review such deposition
pages provided to it as courtesy copies in connection with its
consideration of motions.
This

Order

and

Statement

constitutes

the

Court's

Statement pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and in accordance with that Rule, the parties now have
10 days after the service of this signed Order and Statement to
serve and file their objections, if any, to the preceding Statement.

63971
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ENTERED this

^

day of Ju
BY THE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

l/A^S/£~y

« CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAI
UTAH.
^

William V. Penney
Plaintiff Pro Se

M
EWUVf COURT
O
DEPUTY

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/
y
r
if.
David A. Anderson
>—/

Paul E. Dame
Counsel for Defendants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, via federal
express, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to the
following

at

the

indicated

addresses

on

this

I '

July, 1993:
William V. Penney
709 West Rusk, Suite A101
Rockwall, TX 75087

fail
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v+~~i

day

of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing document to
the following BRIEF OF APPELLEES and ADDENDUM thereto at the
indicated addresses on this /O

day of August, 1993:

William V. Penney
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive
Sandy, UT 84093
William V, Penney
709 West Rusk, Suite A101
Rockwall, TX 75087
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